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Some Aspects of the Development of Capitalism from Below in Lebowa
Introduction
The field research upon which this paper is based involved over 100
interviews, most of which were completed by Andrew Feinstein over
a period of a couple of months in mid-1991. The Development Bank
of South Africa may, or may not, decide to make available the full
results of this work as a joint publication, for which my co-author
will receive most of the credit1. However, the blame for the
content of this seminar paper is my own; it is designed to provoke
academic discussion of the currently fashionable policies of small
business promotion and the views expressed cannot be attributed to
anyone but me.
The issues raised in this paper are not new and it may be useful to
refer very briefly to earlier research, which has provided a
framework for the arguments presented here. In his work on the
development of capitalism in Europe, Dobb (1963) recognised the
critical role of state intervention in, as he put it, "aiding the
emergence of the bourgeoisie". He referred to this support as the
development of capitalism from above. A similar stress on the role
of state intervention in 'short-cutting' the process of forming a
national bourgeoisie in late-industrialising economies is an
important aspect of Gerschenkron's (1962) analysis. More recently,
Amsden (1989) and Sender and Smith (1986) have provided an account
of the economic logic underlying this nurturing role of the state
in a range of East Asian and African economies in the period since
1960. Finally, this paper's interpretation of the data from Lebowa
has clearly been influenced by the results of my own earlier
research in rural Tanzania in the 1970s and 1980s, where privileged
access to state (or parastatal or CCM/TANU) resources was a crucial
element in the accumulation strategies of rural capitalists (Sender
and Smith, 1990).
One issue to be explored in this seminar paper is the paradoxical
inefficiency, or the relative lack of success, with which branches
of the South African state (the Homeland Development Corporations,
the Development Bank of South Africa) have intervened to support
black capitalists in rural South Africa. The most vigorous and
dynamic black capitalist employers in the fieldwork area appeared
to be developing "from below"; they are not relying on privileged
connections to either the local or national apartheid state. More
specifically, they are accumulating without the support of the
Small Business Development Programme (SBDP) of the Development Bank
of Southern Africa, a programme which is implemented by the Lebowa
XA.J. Feinstein and J.B. Sender, "The Impact of the Small
Business Development Programme in Mapulaneng: A Pilot Evaluation",
(October 1991).
Development Corporation.
Dobb also recognised the growth of capitalist production "from
below" or, at least in some respects, in opposition to and
unsupported by those in control of the state. And, in the South
African rural context, Peires (1992) has argued that there is a
"disjunction between the homeland leadership and the homeland
bourgeoisie". He refers to the existence of "a robust and
independent black bourgeoisie which was not (my emphasis) reliant
on the Ciskei government for trading licenses or other
economic necessities"2. The research results from Lebowa provide
some support to the arguments in Peires' recent ASI seminar paper.
Perhaps the most successful of the black businessmen interviewed
were, by scrambling to establish links with the ANC, preparing
themselves for a period in which a new South African state will,
they hope, promote their interests far more effectively. The
content of the most recent ANC policy document suggests that their
hopes will not be in vain. The Policy guidelines assert that,
"Small business activities, which contribute significantly to job
creation, should be actively encouraged by the democratic state.
Special attention will have to be given to the informal sector,
small and medium-sized businesses..." (ANC, 1992).
One possible conclusion to be drawn is that, whatever the failures
of the South African state in promoting dynamic capitalist
accumulation in recent decades, there may now be some expectation
that a post-apartheid state will prove capable of orchestrating
more rapid accumulation in rural areas. However, some of those who
have opposed the apartheid state, may be less sanguine concerning
the benefits of a more effective development of capitalism from
above. Their response to some of the results presented in this
paper may be to question the desirability of the current vogue for
state subsidisation of small business or, at the very least, to
insist on the introduction of legislation and the development of
other forms of protection for the employees of these small
capitalist enterprises.
2Bank (1987) also provides an account of the development of
capitalism from below: "... when one critically investigates the
role of the BIC in Witsiehoek, it is not at all clear that the
major objective of the Corporation was to stimulate the interests
of local black entrepreneurs. During the period 1960 to 1974 the
Corporation . .. undermined [the interests] of local bus owners,
dairy farmers and brick merchants by establishing state
monopolies... It seems clear that black commercial advancement in
Qwaqwa in the 1960s did not occur because of BIC initiatives, but
rather in spite of them!" (p.59).
The Survey
The survey was carried out in Mapulaneng (see map), which is fairly
typical of other districts in Lebowa. Mapulaneng has a total
population of about 220,000 and about 500 small businesses are
believed to be operating in the district. The aim of the survey was
to compare the characteristics of a group of small enterprises
which had been supported by the Small Business Development
Programme of the DBSA through the Lebowa Development Corporation,
with some other small businesses in Mapulaneng.
A total of 30 small businesses which had benefitted from the SBDP
were studied (Table 5.1). Their characteristics and performance
were compared with those of 21 other small businesses, which were
not randomly selected, but were chosen to provide some information
concerning the most dynamic small capitalists in the area (10
businesses) as well as some remotely located/very small businesses
(11). None of this second group of 21 businesses had received any
support from the SBDP.
In addition, data was collected concerning 320 employees of the
businesses surveyed. Detailed interviews were conducted covering
49 of these employees (see Table 6.1).
Characteristics of the Operators of Small Businesses in Mapulaneng
In terms of some conventional socio-economic indicators, the
operators of small businesses, particularly those operating
somewhat larger businesses in the less remote areas of Mapulaneng,
appear to be rather privileged. They have completed a relatively
large number of years at school (see Table 5.4), and their fathers,
too, were more likely to have been educated (Table 5.5). Although
none of the smallest/remote business operators grew up in families
where the mother had been to school, about a third of the other
business operators came from families with educated mothers.
However, the educational status of all the business operators set
them apart from other people in Mapulaneng, where about 40% of the
population is illiterate.
Other socio-economic indicators, such as the possession of consumer
durables, confirm the relative wealth of the successful business
operators (and the business operators supported by the SBDP) as
compared with other people in Mapulaneng (Table 5.7).
As employers, the performance of the different groups of businesses
has been rather diverse. The data suggest that the SBDP, in common
with similar programmes elsewhere in the world, has been remarkably
unsuccessful in allocating support to those capitalists capable of
generating substantial levels of stable employment at adequate wage
rates and with reasonable working conditions3. The status of
female employees (73% of the total employed in these businesses) is
a particular cause for concern. These conclusions were arrived at
by comparing the performance as employers of the businesses
supported by the SBDP with the performance of all the other small
businesses studied in the survey. The following results should be
highlighted:
The SBDP beneficiaries employed a lower proportion of females
and a lower mean number of females per business (4.1 versus 7.9)
than the other businesses.
The employees of the SBDP beneficiaries were more likely to be
over 30 years old than the employees of other businesses (50%
versus 30%). Since a high proportion of the unemployed in
Mapulaneng are youth, this is a serious criticism of their
contribution to alleviating the district's economic problems.
The total employment generated by the SBDP beneficiaries was
lower than the total generated by successful businesses (see Table
6.4).
The SBDP beneficiaries had a higher ratio of casual to
permanent workers than the other businesses.
The relative instability of employment generated by the SBDP
beneficiaries is also shown in Tables 6.5 and 6.6.
All employees wages were low, but the wages of a) females and
b) the employees of the SBDP beneficiaries, who generally paid
lower wages to their female employees, were particularly low.
The lowest wages were received by divorced or widowed women
(about 15% of all female employees), who earned only about 60% of
average male wages in Mapulaneng's small businesses.
Female employees worked for more hours per day and for more
days per week than male employees. They were also less likely ever
to receive pay when they were ill, or to receive paid leave or
overtime (see Table 6.10).
Apart from their relatively poor record as employers, the
beneficiaries of the SBDP were also less successful than non-
supported businesses in Mapulaneng in other respects. They
appeared to be less able to keep accurate accounts (Table 8.2);
their monthly revenues and the value of their enterprises, as
reflected in their estimates of total replacement costs, were also
smaller (see Table 8.3). Moreover, the businesses which had not
been supported by the SBDP appeared to be able to expand their
'See Kilby 1988, Mead 1991, Liedholm 1989, Dessing 1990.
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operations on the basis of retained profits; the SBDP beneficiaries
were more dependent on sources of finance other than enterprise
profits.
The inability to generate sufficient profits for expansion must be
considered a particularly important constraint on the performance
of the SBDP beneficiary businesses, since the SBDP itself has
proved to be an extremely inefficient distributor of finance. The
average time taken to process loan requests by the SBDP in
Mapulaneng was 8.46 months; only 42 percent of applications were
processed in less than 6 months and more than one third of
applications took 10 months or longer (see Table 9.2). This record
is inferior to that of many small business credit agencies in other
developing countries, e.g. Kenya (Kilby 1988). It is also very
inferior to the record of the Standard Bank in the Mapulaneng area,
whose commercial loan applications took an average of only 1.3
months to be processed. The costs to the small businesses reliant
on SBDP loans involved not only these inordinate delays, but also
substantial transaction costs taking the form of bribes, kickbacks,
etc. which were widely reported by the businessmen interviewed.
To summarise, out of 500 or so small businesses in Mapulaneng, the
LDC/DBSA chose to allocate considerable resources to those small
businesses which were:
a) not very poor or disadvantaged, ie. no coherent equity
principles were involved;
b) not particularly dynamic or successful, since even the most
casual tourist in the area could identify other, much more
successful businessmen.
In addition, high transaction costs were incurred by any smal1
business seeking to obtain resources from the SBDP.
The Political Context
It is difficult to understand the inefficient and inequitable
characteristics of state intervention in support of small
businesses in Mapulaneng as outlined above without considering the
political context. An attempt was made to account for the observed
patterns of operation of Mapulaneng's SBDP by examining the
fieldwork results concerning the respondents' political
connections. None of the employees interviewed, and hardly any of
the very small businesses located in remote areas, were able to
call upon any local networks of political support or patronage. In
contrast, the other small businesses and most especially the SBDP
beneficiaries had extremely close connections with the Tribal
Authority (one third fell into this category), or were themselves
Lebowa M.P.s or policemen or very closely related to these salaried
state officials. The most successful small businessmen, who were
not reliant on the SBDP and were in some case commercially
competing with the Lebowa Development Corporation, had no
hesitation whatsoever in providing detailed complaints concerning
the degree of corruption affecting the Lebowa Development
Corporation's allocation of resources4. In this context, it would
be surprising if resources were to be systematically allocated on
efficiency or poverty-alleviating criteria, or if the outcome of
such allocations was a dynamic growth in employment.
More generally, the macro-political context for the SBDP reflects
the ideological dominance of "enterprise culture" in the 1980s.
This ideology remains hegemonic in the early 1990s and consists of
a set of propositions concerning the central role of de-regulated
small business in restructuring economies everywhere, but
especially in the historically highly concentrated South African
economy. A very clear statement of these beliefs concerning small
businesses' "primary role in the intermediate term for effectively
rebalancing the economy", their potential to expand employment
opportunities for women and achieve income gains for the poor and
for black "empowerment" is provided in a recent document from the
DBSA's Centre for Policy Analysis (1992).
This ideology has, at least within the UK and the USA, remained
remarkably immune to detailed, empirically based criticism of the
limited economic benefits observed to stem from a decade of self-
employment promotion and the subsidisation of small business . In
fact, the growth of self employment and small business has been
most rapid in precisely those OECD economies which have the worst
growth and unemployment records. Moreover, any observed rise in
the share of total employment accounted for by small firms in these
economies in the 1980s was simply the outcome of stability or
decline in actual employment in the smallest firms, combined with
a collapse in overall manufacturing employment (Hughes, 1992;
Loutfi,1991).
This record in the OECD economies, and the more dispassionate
accounts of the performance of small business in developing
economies, should be brought to the forefront of policy debates in
South Africa. One aim of this paper is to draw attention to the
absence of rigorous, micro-based evaluations of the impact of the
plethora of small business promotion projects currently being
subsidised by the South African state, as well as NGOs and "Service
"In Qwaqwa, Bank (1987) notes that: "The wives of influential
bureaucrats were seen to acquire [trading] licences relatively
easily" (p.146), and that "... of all the licensed traders in the
sample some 70% admitted to having paid monies at various levels to
ensure the rapid passage of licence applications" (p.201).
Organisations"5. If a less stagnant and backward form of
capitalist development is to characterise the 1990s, the time is
probably ripe for a more serious academic debate concerning the
form which subsidies promoting a new generation of rural
capitalists should take.
sThe resources involved are considerable: The Small Business
Development Corporation alone has nine different revolving funds
for "small" business, which were capitalized at R245 million in
1990. Some of the other organisations involved include the Get
Ahead Foundation, Matchmaker Services, the African Development Bank
Small Business Unit and the First National Bank Small Business
Unit.
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Table 3.1: TJie Sample of Small Businc^ Operators*
a) Small Business Loanees
b) Imerging Industry Clients
c) Informal Sector Loanees
d) LDC Loan Defaulter
15
10
4
Per rent
29.4
19.6
7.8
-1Q
SUBTOTAL SBDP BENEFICIARIES: 30 58.8
e) Most Successful Businesses
f) Standard Bank Loanees
g) LDC Loan Refusees
h) Ex-Client of Factory Centre
SUBTOTAL NON-SBDP BENEFICIARIES:
i) Remote Small Businesses
j) Informal Sector Non Loanees
3
3
3
-I
10
8
.5.9
5.9
5.9
19.6
15.7
SUBTOTAL POOR NON SBDP BENEFICIARIES: 11 21.6
. TOTAL
Table 5.4: Number of Yenrs of School
SBDP Beneficiaries
Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
Poor Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
Entire_ Population
Mean
S.6667
9.5000
3.6364
7.7451
51 100
Standard Deviation Cases
3.0999
1.6499
3.7755
3.7086
30
10
11
51
Table 5.5: Menn Nnmhpr of Yean of Schooling of Fathers
Mean Standard^ Qeviaiion
SBDP Beneficiaries
Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
Poor Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
2.6071
1.5000
1.2000
3.6039
2.5495
2.6998
Prfpnlnrinn- 2.0833 3.2409
Table 5.7: Indicators of Wealth/Acquisition of Consumer Durables for Small Business
Operators and Their Employees
Percentage of Household Owning None of
SBDP Beneficiaries:
Non-SBDP Beneficiaries:
Poor Non-SBDP Beneficiaries:
(Employees of the Above)
Flush
Toilets
73.3
40.0
100.0
(98.0)
Refrigerator Modern Cooking
Facility
36.7
10.0
100.0
(87.8)
6.6
0
36.4
(25.0)
Domestic Electricity Piped
Supply Water Car
SBDP Beneficiaries
Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
Poor Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
(Employees of the Above)
63.3
40.0
100.0
(100.0)
63.3 .
30.0
100.00
(98.0)
20.0
0
36.4
(75.5)
Mean Number of Items in the Household:
Radios Tables. Clocks Tele-vision
SBDP Beneficiaries: 133
Non-SBDP Beneficiaries: 1.8
Poor Non-SBDP Beneficiaries: 1.0
(Employees of the Above): (1.12)
2.43
2.60
1.81
(2.14)
1.07
2.2
0.69
(0.51)
0.97
1.0
0.18
(0.12)
f
Table 6.1: 11te Sample nf Employee?
Employees of:
a) Small Business Loanees
b) Emerging Industry Gients
c) Informal Sector Loanees
SUBTOTAL = FrnrlrtvpffS »f ^BOP Beneficiaries: 31
d) Most Successful Businesses
e) Informal Sector Non-Loanees
f) Standard Bank Loanees
g) Remote Small Businesses
h) Ex-Client of Factory Centre
SUBTOTAL = Fpipinvpo* nf Mnn-SBDP Rpnrtldaries 18
Percent
17
10
4
34.7
20.4
8.2
633
12.2
2.0'
$2
12.2
36J
TOTAL 49
Table 6.4: Mean Total Number nf Emnlnvrw by Category of Employer
SBDP.Beneficiaries
Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
Poor Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
Mean
5.73
12.6
2.0
Standard Deviation
5.771
10.255
2.449
Table 6.5: Percentage Decline in Total Number of Employees: Peak to Current
Mean Percentage ' Standard Deviation
30.44
25.95
37.13
SBDP Beneficiaries 21.29
Non-SBDP Beneficiaries 11.32
Poor Non-SBDP Beneficiaries 19.75
Table 6.6: Months of Employment in Current Job, fry Category nf Employer
Mean Months Employment $tM(l«"l
SBDP Supported Businesses
Non-SBDP Supported Businesses
26.7
30.6
36.45
33.84
Table 6.9: Indicators of Acquisition of Consumer Durables bv Cn^rv of Employee.
All Employees:
Females
Widowed, Divorced, Unmarried Employees:
[All Employers:]
Mean
No. Clocks
0.51
0.19
(1.176)
Mean
No.TVs
0.122
0.095
(0.804)
Mean
NoS&ccs
0.49
0.29
(0.706)
Information on working conditions is provided in Table 6.10, which indicates that all
employees were on average working for 9.84 hours per day, with female employees working
for an average of 10.07 hours and males for 9.19 hours per day. This Table also shows
that females worked for more days per week on average, and were less likely ever to receive
pay when they were ill, or to receive paid leave or overtime pay.
Table 6.10 Working Conditions, bv Sex
Hours Worked Days Worked
Per Dav Per Week
Males
Females
All
Employees
9.19
10.07
9.84
5.57
6.38
6.16
No No Overtime No Paid
Sickpay(%) Pay (%). Lmc&r)
76.9%
86.1%
83.7%
45.5%
81.5%
71.1%
27.3%
38.9%
36.2%
Business
SBDP Beneficiaries
Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
Poor Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
Temporaiy
Structure
3
0
45
T.ihle R.~>: Bookkeeping Facilities, bv Catet'otv
SBDP Beneficiaries
Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
Poor Non-SBDP Beneficiaries
Mean No.
Tills
0.65
2.5
0.27
Flimsy
Structure
121
1
0
45
of Business
Mean No.
Calculators
0.7
3.8
0.6
Small
Premises
20
0
73
No Book-
keeping
1%
0%
36%
No Phone
Connected
60
30
100
Unsophisticated
Book-keeping
31%
20%
36%
Table 8.3: Total Replacement Costs and Highest Monthly Revenues, hv Category of.
Business
% With Replacement
Costs less than 50.000
% With Highest Monthly
Revenues less than R9.000
'SBDP Beneficiaries 50%
Non-SBDP Beneficiaries 10%
Poor Non-SBDP Beneficiaries 73%
59%
0%
81%
Table: 9.2: Number of Months Taken to Process SBDP Loan Applications
Less than 3 months
3 to 5 months
6 to \) months
10 to 12 months
More than 24 months
No. of I oqns.
4
7
!>
7
Percentage of Loans
15.4%
26.9%
23.1%
26.9%
26
1.1 ^ 'n
100
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